

*1-41: in mem by
buried - still of interest
Mh*

26 March 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI

14 APR 1959

Gordon Gray came over for a brief half hour with the Board of Estimates and then lunch. Having apparently just come from a very frustrating NSC session (on Berlin which he got put into the NSC circuit, and NATO, which the President told him to stay off of), he was in a quite talkative mood. He started out by saying that we had been quite cooperative and that he had no complaints whatsoever on that score.

However, he raised without being critical the recent haggle over a Cyprus NIE as an indication of the problems one faces in the NSC machinery. In the Greek OCB Report last February a new policy paper on Cyprus was recommended. As soon as PB approved I notified ONE that the NIE would be desirable and would inform them of timing as soon as I could. ONE has been fighting the problem ever since alleging that they and State must both wait for more time to get dope on Cyprus and what the hell's the hurry for a Cyprus paper anyway. I duly prodded Lay who asked Gray who decided that a Cyprus paper was needed fairly soon rather than waiting until the intelligence community had gotten all its ducks in a row. I predicted that this would be the result of raising the question. At any rate Abbot Smith explained all the problems of producing NIE's and Gordon listened patiently.

Far more interesting, Gordon spoke quite freely of his concern over the fact that many of the most important policy questions were never run through the NSC (he commented on the fact that NSC had never handled German reunification, much less Berlin, noted that the Far East paper was five years old, complained that for 18 months State kept NSC out of Middle East policy saying we must wait till the dust settled, and finally that the last paper on NATO was five years old). Gray stated his strong feeling that such problems should be run through the corporate body designed to deal with them and this explains a lot of his pressure on State re Middle East, NATO, etc. This morning he had apparently gotten the President to agree to handling the Berlin problem through the NSC but was told no soap on NATO on which he badly wants to write a paper because of his views on MC-70 and the unlikelihood of our meeting them. He is also very pleased that he managed to get State's agreement to review the Far East policy.

Gordon went on to complain of the over-attendance at NSC meetings saying that every time the President chafed at this he reminded the President of the latter's responsibility for inviting these people. Gray also cited DCI as one of those who wanted to bring along an assistant to answer questions pointing out that when each member brought an assistant this doubled attendance. At lunch Gray advanced some of his pet theories, such as his feeling that it is impossible to raise the standard of living in the underdeveloped countries and that we must not make it our policy to do so. I have asked ORR if they can provide the meat for a memo from you to Gray because I am convinced that he is feeding the President this line and I believe that a strong rebuttal on grounds both of irrelevancy and inaccuracy is called for even though we may not be the right ones to make it.



R. W. KOMER

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